Introduction
During the 63-year life of the European Convention to date, Europe has witnessed an array of conflicts. This article reviews the role played by the Convention in two of them -the conflict in Northern Ireland between those who want it to remain part of the United Kingdom and those who want it to become part of a re-unified Ireland, and the conflict in Turkey between State authorities and the armed supporters of an independent or autonomous Kurdish region where Kurds could enjoy greater political and cultural rights.
The main aim is to assess the principles and procedures which the Convention organs in at times, mainly Catholics) wanted the area to be part of Ireland rather than part of the United Kingdom, while in Turkey a substantial minority (up to 20%) claimed that their Kurdish identity was not being appropriately recognized under Turkish law. In response to the unrest both the UK and Turkish governments adopted special security measures, including some new laws, and it was mainly these which resulted in numerous applications being lodged in Strasbourg. The challenge facing the Commission and Court was to ensure that victims of human rights abuses had access to justice but also that governments should have some margin of appreciation to take measures which they deemed proportionate to deal with the unrest. No doubt the Commission and Court wanted the conflicts to be resolved, but their primary goal was to see that in particular cases a fair decision was reached as to whether human rights had been abused or not. Although the conflicts did occasionally spill over into neighbouring States, they were essentially internal security threats and not conflicts between nations. They each involved violent insurgencies, led in Northern Ireland by the Irish Republican Army (the IRA), although other paramilitary organizations were active as well, and in Turkey by the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK). Prior to 1987 only inter-state cases brought against Turkey could be considered in Strasbourg, and then only by the Commission. The conflict in Northern Ireland was at the heart of the first ever decision reached by the European Court in 1960 2 and was also the focal point of the first inter-State case to result in a judgment from the European Court in 1978. 3 Turkey faced an inter-State complaint from France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands concerning alleged human rights abuses committed by the military government in the early 1980s, but this was settled before reaching the Court, 4 as was another inter-State case taken by Denmark against Turkey relating to the alleged illtreatment of a Danish national while detained in Turkey. 5 When Turkey was eventually brought before the European Court by another State, it was in relation to its actions in Cyprus. 6 As will be explained below, applications relating to the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey have led the Court to elaborate new substantive doctrines, especially in relation to the right to life and the right not to be ill-treated, as well as new procedural approaches, especially in relation to exhaustion of domestic remedies and fact-finding. Much, though, still remains to be done to make the European Convention a more effective instrument in conflict resolution. The fact that the Convention is notoriously weak on the protection of minorities is a significant encumbrance in this regard. 7 Another salient feature of the Court's approach has been its reluctance to find a government responsible for systematic abuses of human rights during counter-insurgency activities. Its focus on individual cases appears to make the Court loathe to issue more general pronouncements about a State's overall response to civil unrest.
This article proceeds by summarising the main features of Strasbourg's engagement with the conflict in Northern Ireland before turning to how it has engaged with the conflict in Turkey. The latter section cross-refers to the former where appropriate and the article concludes with some brief general conclusions regarding the ability of the ECHR to play a significant role during times of serious non-international conflicts.
The Conflict in Northern Ireland
The number of applications lodged with the European Commission and Court of Human Rights arising out of the conflict in Northern Ireland is much less than that arising out of the conflict in Turkey. 8 In general terms, the Strasbourg organs have moved over time from a relatively 'hands-off' approach to a much more interventionist one. This is partly attributable to better presentation of applications by applicants' lawyers but also to a growing maturity within the European Court itself as it has gradually developed a method for ensuring that human rights are not easily sacrificed on the altar of political expediency within Member States. As will be seen, Strasbourg's more 'hands-on' approach to cases stemming from the conflict in Turkey is partly a consequence of the relative severity of the human rights violations committed by the security forces there: while security forces Subsequent applications were more successful, but by no means in every respect.
We will consider them under the headings of the right to liberty, the right not to be i lltreated, the right to life and the right to a fair trial.
The right to liberty
In 1971 the use of internment without trial was authorised in Northern Ireland.
Hundreds of men who were sympathetic to the cause of Irish republicanism were detained without trial, some for what turned out to be more than three years. 
The right not to be ill-treated
The first case to raise issues concerning the alleged mistreatment of detainees in
Northern Ireland was Donnelly v UK. 36 There were seven applicants involved, this time carefully selected on the basis of their actual victimhood. Each of the men alleged that he had been beaten while in police custody -some said that they had received blows to the head and body, others that they had been kicked in the genitals or given electric shocks to their genitals. Three of the applicants even alleged that against their will they had been administered 'truth drugs' to make them confess to crimes. In all they referred to 157 specific cases of alleged ill-treatment. 37 The applicants asked for a temporary injunction to put a halt to such practices pending the outcome of their applications. They also asked for their applications to be given expedited consideration and for a full investigation t o be conducted into the alleged systemic brutality. With commendable speed, the European Commission announced just seven weeks after the applications had been lodged that it would indeed expedite their consideration but that it had no power to issue a temp orary injunction.
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In 1973, the Commission declared the applications to be admissible, 39 which in itself was a significant triumph for the applicants, not only because the Commission was prepared to proceed with the case even though similar allegations were still pending before the European Commission in the inter-State application lodged by Ireland in 1971, 40 but also because it established two propositions which have since become firm rules within the European Convention system. The first is that an individual can complain that an administrative practice is a systematic breach of the Convention provided that he or she adduces prima facie evidence of such a practice and of the applicant being a victim of it.
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The second is that when an individual alleges the existence of such an administrative practice he or she does not first have to exhaust domestic remedies in that regard: instead, the question of the effectiveness of those domestic remedies can be considered at the same time as, and as part of, the merits of the application. conclusions for the time and marked a somewhat unheralded coming-of-age for the European Commission in its handling of applications under the Convention. This article will show below that allegations of an administrative practice and exceptions to the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies also came to characterize a sizeable portion of security-related applications lodged from Turkey.
Unfortunately, the initial triumph at the admissibility stage in Donnelly v UK turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. After the Commission had examined the merits of th e claim, it decided that the alleged administrative practice could not be considered to be in violation of the Convention because evidence had not been adduced to show that it rendered domestic remedies ineffective or inadequate. 43 Three of the seven applicants were held not to have exhausted the local remedies available to them within the legal system of Northern Ireland.
The other four had already received financial settlements in respect of their claims. The
Commission was therefore of the view that it had been shown that the machinery for providing compensation had worked effectively in practice. It considered at some length the applicants' wider argument that, in the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland, compensation was not an adequate remedy for their complaints, since they were allegedly the victims of an administrative practice, 44 but it concluded that the procedures in place to prevent the occurrence or repetition of the acts complained of were effective enough for the purposes of the Convention.
All in all, the Donnelly case presented a further lesson to applicants and lawyers alike. Providing that a State is systematically failing to comply with its Convention obligations is extremely difficult, especially at a time when a conflict is raging and the collection of hard evidence is highly problematic. The reluctance of the Strasbourg organs to implicate the government in systematic violations of human rights persisted in insurgency-related Turkish cases as well. Suggestions that a State is failing in its obligations can be easily defeated by the State showing that it is making its best effort to prevent abuses of rights. In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, it was almost always fatal to an applicant's case that he or she had started civil legal proceedings in the domestic legal system, for this automatically undermined any allegations that domestic remedies were ineffective, even in Article 3 cases. 58 As will be seen in the context of the Turkish cases, while the Court did take some daring decisions holding the State responsible for torture, in the majority of cases the high threshold set to distinguish torture from inhuman and degrading treatment has rigorously been applied to absolve the State from the stigma of torture.
The right to life
Allegations that the British security forces had breached the right to life of protestors and terrorist suspects were also raised by the Irish government in the inter-State case, but were held to be inadmissible for lack of evidence. Other cases raising the same right had either also been declared inadmissible (because, for example, there was evidence that the victim was rioting at the time, 59 or that the security forces had acted in self-defence 60 objective. 64 The decision emphasized States' positive obligations to take effective security measures before resorting to the use of lethal force and to conduct effective official investigation into suspicious deaths. This meant that States were not merely to refrain from taking life unless absolutely necessary for one of the purposes set out in Article 2(2), but that when death transpires they must take positive measures to investigate the circumstances and provide appropriate remedies in case of any fault attributable to the security forces. These principles have since been applied in numerous other cases, including applications taken against Turkey, where the absence of effective official inquiries into arbitrary deprivation of the right to life (or of property) were often found to constitute breaches of the Convention. 
The right to a fair trial
The United Kingdom set up special juryless courts in Northern Ireland ('Diplock courts') to try people accused of 'scheduled offences', but these were never condemned by the Strasbourg Court as being in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In some ways they may have operated more fairly than jury trials, since the judges in question were obliged to give written treasons for their conclusions and persons convicted had an automatic right of appeal to a three-judge Court of Appeal. Likewise, attempts to limit the right of accused persons to remain silent during police questioning were very largely held to be consistent with that provision in Murray (John) v UK. 70 Later, though, the lack of access to a solicitor, when coupled with the limits on the right to remain silent, was found to be a violation, 71 and in another case the conditions in which a detainee was held were found to tip the scale in favour of there being a breach. 72 These conditions had been experienced by hundreds of former detainees but had never previously been condemned in such terms by either a domestic or an international court.
In the absence of any imaginative use of Article 14 in the Northern Ireland context, it was Article 6 which eventually came to the aid of people who were unable to challenge alleged discrimination at their workplace on the basis of their religious belief or political Northern Ireland announced that solicitors were henceforth to be allowed to sit with detainees when they were being interviewed by the police. The head of the police and the government had previously argued that there was no legislative authority for such a
practice, yet in the end it was able to be adopted without any new law or regulation having to be passed. and thus somewhat improved the country's long-lamented human rights record. 74 For further details see Dickson, n 8 above, 182-4. 75 Nonetheless, human rights issues connected with the Kurdish question remain centre-stage amid the uncertainty over frustrated attempts at bringing about a durable peace settlement.
The following section will focus on Strasbourg's approach to the anti-terrorism measures adopted by the Turkish state in response to the PKK insurgency. As with Northern
Ireland critical issues will be explored, such as the exhaustion and effectiveness of domestic remedies, the declaration of states of emergency and resort to derogations, and the allegations of discrimination and systematic administrative malpractices, with a view to shedding a brighter light on the actual and potential impact of the European Convention on conflicted societies.
The right to individual petition
The troubled situation in southeast Turkey led the authorities to introduce a long 78 Akdivar, n 65 above. 79 See the text at n 36 et seq above.
whether domestic remedies had to be exhausted at all times, the Court held that account had to be taken not only of the formal remedies at hand, but of the particular circumstances of each case. The Court concluded that there was no requirement to exhaust domestic remedies if those remedies were inadequate. It added, however, that 'its ruling [was] confined to the particular circumstances of the present case.' 80 In other words, the relaxation of the exhaustion rule did mean that there was an automatic entitlement to circumvent local remedies. The Court maintained its traditional approach in other cases, where it stressed that its position on nonexhaustion of local remedies was not to be interpreted as a general statement that remedies were ineffective in southeast Turkey or that future applicants were absolved from the obligation to have initial recourse to domestic courts. 81 During the admissibility hearings the Turkish government displayed considerable suspicion towards the applicants who were complaining about counter-insurgency measures. 82 The government also accused petitioners of manipulating the Convention system in order to undermine Turkey's national security and legitimate the activities of the PKK. 83 It further maintained that the failure of applicants to exhaust local remedies was an abuse of the right of individual petition and part of a strategy aimed at denigrating Turkey. 84 In response to such claims, the ECtHR stated that the respondent State's arguments could be accepted only if it were clear that the applications were based on untrue facts, which here had not been demonstrated. 85 Another issue faced by the applicants concerned the right to petition under Article 25 of the ECHR without any hindrance from the State (now Article 34). Some applicants complained that they were subjected to pressure from the authorities to modify or withdraw their applications. In Akdivar, where the applicants were questioned by domestic authorities about their petitions, the Court found a violation of Article 25. 86 In Kurt, 87 the Court held that the government's pressure on the applicant to withdraw her application was illicit, and that the threat of criminal measures against her lawyer was unacceptable. 88 In Orhan, 89 where the applicant was summoned before the prosecutor on account of his application, the ECtHR similarly found this direct contact with the applicant to be inappropriate. In analogous cases, the Court consistently stated that Member States had to avoid dissuading or discouraging applicants or their representatives from pursuing a Convention remedy.
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First instance fact-finding
In view of persistent strong disagreements between applicants and the Turkish government over the depiction of alleged events stemming from the emergency region, the 97 Strasbourg organs came to refrain from fact-finding hearings after the end of 1990s, when the conflict lost its in the emergency region, which in turn undermined the official claim that applicants had acted with the main motive of discrediting the State.
Allegations of systematic violations
As in Northern Ireland, Turkish cases in Strasbourg emerged against a backdrop of an entrenched political crisis which engendered acts of terrorism, but also unconventional counter-terrorism measures that violated human rights on a large scale.
Allegations of an 'administrative practice' featured regularly in the individual applications during the 1990s, 98 where it was essentially argued that the violations suffered amounted to a systematic practice due to their unremitting and discriminatory character and that it was therefore necessary to examine not only individual incidents complained of but also the overall context and pattern within which such infractions transpired. The following cases attest to the gravity of the allegations concerning the existence of an administrative practice in Turkey. In Aksoy, the applicant complained that he was tortured during his 14-day incommunicado detention in the emergency region where national authorities tolerated widespread violations of human rights and failed to provide effective remedies.
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Although the Court found domestic remedies illusory and inadequate, thereby absolving the applicant from the rule of exhaustion, 'it did not find it necessary' to determine whether there indeed existed an official practice of systematically tolerating human rights abuses.
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Likewise, the applicants in Akdivar complained that they were victims of an administrative policy which condoned the destruction of some three thousand villages and the displacement of almost two million people. They further stressed that since massive population displacement was a State-inspired strategy, it was impossible to make recourse to effective remedies. 105 Whilst the Court found exceptional circumstances which absolved the applicants from their duty to exhaust local remedies, it did not consider the evidence strong enough to justify a finding of an administrative practice.
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Analogously, in a string of judgments concerning the claim that the applicants had been subjected to gross violations on account of their Kurdish origin, the Strasbourg organs found allegations of ethnic discrimination to be unsubstantiated; this mirrors what occurred in relation to cases from Northern Ireland, where applicants were repeatedly told that they had not adduced enough evidence to substantiate their claims that they had been discriminated against on grounds of religion, political opinion, national origin or association with a national minority. Likewise, in Kurt, 107 where the applicant asserted that forced disappearances mainly targeted people of Kurdish origin, the Court deemed the evidence insufficient to reach such a conclusion. Similarly, in both Akdivar and Hasan Ilhanli, 108 the Court refused to draw an inference of a discriminatory policy of mass house demolitions targeting the Kurdish community.
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Put in a nutshell, submissions that violations were part and parcel of an administrative or discriminatory practice were dismissed by the Strasbourg bodies either on the basis of insufficient evidence or on the unsatisfactory ground that it was 'not necessary to determine whether the failings identified [were] part of a practice adopted by the authorities.' 110 As with cases from Northern Ireland, the Convention organs steadfastly adopted a case-by-case, factspecific approach to all counter-terrorism related issues. While a finding that there had been a systematic administrative or discriminatory practice would have placed much heavier pressure on Turkish authorities to conduct its anti-terror measures in line with Convention requirements, Strasbourg's choice of handling each case as an isolated incident was arguably critical for ensuring that Turkey did not become wholly alienated from the Council of Europe. This quasipolitical stance might also have motivated the ECtHR when dealing with some of the human rights issues arising in Northern Ireland, in particular the alleged abuses resulting from derogation notices, discrimination on grounds of religious belief or political opinion, internment without trial and ill-treatment of detainees. s
Village destructions
One of the most distinguishing features of the Turkish conflict has been the village destruction phenomenon. In its combat against the PKK insurgency, the Turkish security forces evacuated and destroyed over three thousand rural settlements. The practice of village destruction during the 1990s forced over three million inhabitants to leave their homes.
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Kurds who were suspected of providing shelter to the PKK, or who refused to be recruited into the State-sponsored paramilitary 'village guard system', were at times made an example of by having their villages burnt down -a strategy which was aimed at depriving the PKK of access to food, shelter and potential recruits. 112 The motive behind the village destructions has never been the subject of Strasbourg scrutiny; the rulings eschewed the difficult question of whether destructions had been a form of punishment for the applicants' alleged involvement in the PKK. . 111 The PKK, too, contributed to forced displacement of people, especially by targeting those who agreed to become 'village guards' to help fight the insurgency. 112 Since the capture of the PKK leader in 1999, the government has announced a number of programmes to encourage the return of the forcefully displaced people. Nevertheless, the programmes have failed due to notable deficits in planning and financing the resettlement. of the treatment. In Dulas, 114 the fact that the applicant was over 70 when her home and property were destroyed before her eyes, leaving her destitute and without shelter and obliging her to leave her accustomed community, and the fact that there was no official remedy to alleviate her plight, were all considered in reaching the conclusion that the complained acts amounted to inhuman treatment. 115 Again, in Yoyler, 116 the destruction of the applicant's home was not only found to constitute a grave and unjustified interference with the applicant's rights to privacy and property, but also with his right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment. The finding of inhuman treatment was similarly justified on grounds that the victim's house was burned before the eyes of his family members, rendering them vulnerable without any support and obliging them to seek a livelihood elsewhere. 117 In a series of cases brought on behalf of the displaced, the Strasbourg bodies generally found the authorities responsible for destroying homes and possessions. 118 The Court acted on the premise that since home and privacy are inextricably connected, the destruction of the villages constituted grave and unjustified interferences with the applicants' rights to privacy and family lives as well as the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. political context characterised by high incidents of torture, unexplained deaths and forced disappearances. Having applied its high standard of proof, the Court found no substantial breach of Article 2 on grounds that the allegations were merely presumptions resting on purportedly tolerated practices of disappearances and extra-judicial killings of detainees. 125 Concerning the claim that the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the disappearance constituted a separate violation of Article 2, the Court surprisingly examined the claim under Article 5, ruling that the victim was subjected to unacknowledged detention in the complete absence of the safeguards contained in Article 5. 126 The case of Cakici 127 occasioned for the first time a finding of a substantial breach of Article 2. The applicant complained that his brother disappeared in 1993 after being subjected to unacknowledged detention by the security forces. In 1996, only after the transmission of government submissions to the Commission, the applicant learned that his brother had been killed by the security forces in an alleged clash with PKK militants in 1995. The government asserted that the victim was identified by his identity card found on his person. Deviating from its approach in Kurt, the Court not merely examined the disappearance claim under Article 2 but attached significant weight to 'circumstantial evidence based on concrete elements' in reaching the conclusion that the applicant must have died after his unacknowledged detention. 128 While the facts of Cakici were not markedly distinct from those of Kurt, the Court in the instant case had no hesitation in drawing 'very strong inferences' from the authorities'
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claim that the victim's identity card was found on the body of a dead terrorist.
129
In another leading case, Timurtas v Turkey, 130 where the victim lost his life during his six-and-a-half year unacknowledged detention, the Court found a violation of Article 2 on both substantial and procedural grounds. 131 Once again, in a bid to distinguish its approach from Kurt, the Court employed rather unconvincing reasoning by stating that in the present case the passage of time since the detention was six-and-a-half years (two years longer than in Kurt), that it had been established that the victim was taken to a place of detention (in Kurt the victim was seen to be surrounded by the soldiers), and that there was no doubt that the victim was wanted by the authorities about his alleged involvement with the PKK (in Kurt the victim was 125 Ibid, para 108. 126 Ibid, paras 128-129. 127 Cakiçi, n 94 above. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. Court concluded that such treatment, considering its serious and cruel nature, could only be described as torture. 135 It is worth noting that Aksoy also occasioned a significant shift in the distribution of the burden of proof in some allegations of torture: if individuals are taken into custody in good health but are found on release to be injured, national authorities must offer a plausible explanation for the injury. that an act of rape, in and of itself, could amount to torture. In Aydin, the applicant was repeatedly beaten, forced to remain naked, and then raped by an unidentified agent in police custody. 142 The Court held that 'the accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel act of rape to which she was subjected amounted to torture'. 143 Significantly, the findings of Aydin inspired a landmark judgement in Akayesu 144 where the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found responsibility for genocide and war crimes based on acts of rape.
When the lack of adequate and effective local remedies for torture victims became the subject of complaints, the ECtHR emphasised the fact that terrorism did not give authorities carte blanche to hold suspects in detention free from judicial review and to deny unlawfully detained individuals the right to seek effective remedies. 145 Likewise, the Court found breaches of the right to an effective remedy on account of the failure of national authorities to carry out prompt and effective investigations into alleged violations capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and to the compensation of the victim where necessary. 146 These judgments, despite their non-assertive character, sought to break the cycle of impunity for perpetrators of gross violations. victims of human rights abuses committed in pursuit of anti-terrorism. 156 Amelioration of the procedural safeguards at police custody is worth mentioning too. Deferring to the Salduz judgment, 157 Turkey adopted a series of measures to remove barriers which inhibited early access to legal assistance for those on remand and other untried detainees. 158 Further democratic reforms encompassed the abolition of the death penalty 159 the introduction of a zero tolerance policy on torture 160 (which reduced significantly the number of reported cases of torture and ill-treatment), as well as the lifting of the decades-old state of emergency regime 161 and restrictions on Kurdish broadcasting. Although restrictions remained on the use of the Kurdish language in public education, 162 these progressive cultural initiatives, culminating in the formation of a State-run Kurdish TV channel, marked a dramatic departure from the assimilationist policies of the past. 163 Regrettably, since the second half of 2015 the pace of reforms has come to a standstill.
Even before the recommencement of hostilities, change in practice was generally slow and faltering, for the administrative and juridical structures often resisted reforms, in large measure due to their statist reflexes which urged them to maintain the political status quo. 164 The high number of cases against Turkey at Strasbourg also demonstrates that there is not yet an adequate incorporation of European jurisprudence into the country's practices. 165 Turkey continues to rank among the countries that have the highest number of non-implemented ECtHR judgments because of structural problems that hinder the effective protection and promotion of human rights. 166 As the EU's 2015 Report underlined, the recent re-escalation of the conflict between the military and PKK insurgents has led to tangible backsliding in some key areas, including freedom of expression, judicial independence and, perhaps most importantly, the process for settling the Kurdish issue. 167 Another 2015 Council of Europe Report stressed that Turkey should make progress in such matters as re-opening unfair criminal proceedings, reducing the length of detention on remand and preventing excessive actions of the security forces. 168 What is more, securing the criminal liability of public officials for grave breaches remains problematic. Despite numerous Strasbourg rulings requiring Turkey to conduct effective investigations into alleged violations, with a view to the potential prosecution of suspected offenders, Turkey has yet to eradicate the culture of impunity for violations committed within the context of counter-terrorism. Among the major obstacles to accountability are the need to obtain administrative authorisation to initiate proceedings against the security personnel and the 20-year statute of limitations for the prosecution of those responsible for egregious breaches. 169 The result is that many unresolved offences from the 1990s now risk being timed out, forgotten and unaccounted for.
Conclusion
After such a brief analysis of the Convention jurisprudence arising out of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey it would be unwise to try to identify specific juridical patterns established by the Convention organs or to draw all-encompassing lessons as to how the jurisprudence could be employed to balance security concerns and human rights issues in other conflict zones. It nevertheless appears plausible to offer the following two broad observations on the Northern Irish and Turkish experiences. and 'practical and effective' approach. In short, in this context the ECHR has not been treated as a 'living instrument' to the degree that it might have been.
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Second, it is principally in conflict-related cases that the Court has, to its credit, developed the doctrine of substantive positive obligations arising out of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. By finding violations of these positive obligations, sometimes described as procedural rather than substantive, the Court has managed to send a message to the States concerned that their discretion is not as broad when they are asked by litigants to get to the bottom of what practices were carried out with or without the State's blessing. On the other hand, Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, guaranteeing the rights to an effective remedy and to be free from discrimination, have been relatively under-utilised by the Court when processing complaints in the context of internal conflicts. This is disappointing, since it represents a neglected opportunity to make a helpful contribution to the settlement of conflicts centred around contested ethno-political, racial, linguistic and religious differences. This might be an area where, through reports and interventions, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights could play a more prominent role in helping the
